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Abstract  
The new fertilizer subsidies in Sub-Saharan Africa are intended to increase agricultural production and 
ensure fertilizer market development. Fertilizer adoption requires complementary inputs such as 
investment in soil and water conservation for efficient and optimal nutrient uptake, and many fertilizer 
subsidy programmes implicitly assume that fertilizer subsidies crowd in such investments. The present 
study, therefore, evaluates the impact of fertilizer subsidies on the provision of soil and water 
conservation efforts in Ghana. The results indicate that beneficiaries of the studied fertilizer subsidy 
programme do not invest significantly more in soil and water conservation, which advises against 
excessive reliance on farmers to respond to fertilizer subsidies with substantial investment in soil and 
water conservation. Thus, in order to achieve increased investment in soil and water conservation for 
sustainable agricultural development, more comprehensive measures that include these investments 
explicitly (such as integrated soil fertility management programmes) may be needed. 
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1.0: Introduction 
The principal objective of this paper is to empirically evaluate the impact of fertilizer 
subsidies on investment in soil and water conservation. Specifically, the study evaluates the 
extent to which fertilizer subsidies nudge soil and water conservation efforts among 
smallholders in Ghana. Soil fertility depletion is a fundamental biophysical factor that 
accounts for the declining agricultural production in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Scoones and 
Toulmin, 1999). Moreover, the low agricultural production and income reinforce the decline 
in soil fertility as the degradation of land and water resources also reduces the capacity of 
farmers to undertake investments in soil and water conservation (see e.g. Pender and Hazell, 
2000; Shiferaw and Bantilan, 2004; Shiferaw et al., 2009). Despite the failure of past fertilizer 
subsidy programmes in SSA, many experts still maintain that fertilizer subsidies are needed to 
create demand and supply for fertilizer market development and higher sustainable 
agricultural production, and in the end facilitate development. Although the extent to which 
these multiple objectives are met depends on investment in soil and water conservation, many 
of the existing fertilizer subsidy programmes implicitly assume that subsidizing fertilizer 
alone will lead to significant investments in soil and water conservation. Therefore, the 
relationship between fertilizer subsidies and investment in soil and water conservation is 
fundamental to the design of new fertilizer subsidy programmes, and the purpose of this study 
is to explore this relationship. 
For far too long, the net effect of agricultural production on soil fertility has been negative in 
SSA (see e.g. Stoorvogel and Smaling, 1990; Stoorvogel et al., 1993; de Jager et al., 1998), 
and this is costly to agricultural production (see e.g. Alfsen et al., 1997; Biggelaar et al., 2004; 
Diao and Sarpong, 2007). For example, using an economy-wide multimarket model for 
Ghana, Diao and Sarpong (2007) estimate the impact of agricultural soil loss on agricultural 
gross domestic product to be 5% from 2006 to 2015 (i.e. about US$4.2 billion). The reasons 
for land degradation include population growth and inappropriate land practices (Scoones and 
Toulmin, 1999). However, Boserup (1965) argues that these same factors should constitute 
the basis for investment in soil fertility through technological innovations and recognizes the 
role of public policies in nudging these technological innovations. Specifically, land scarcity 
and degradation provide farmers with incentives to invest in technological innovations and 
cultivation practices such as soil and water conservation to boost agricultural production and 
income (Boserup, 1965). 
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It is a paradox that fertilizer adoption in SSA is low given the high rate of return to fertilizer 
use and the high levels of land degradation and nutrient mining related to agricultural 
production. The fertilizer intensity in Africa in 2000 was 8 1kgha−  as compared to 96 1kgha−
for East and Southeast Asia and 101 1kgha−  for South Asia (Morris et al., 2007). 
Explanations for this seeming anomaly range from market imperfections to systematic biases 
in dynamic decisions. Holden et al. (1998) suggest that credit market imperfections and a high 
rate of time preference could generally hinder investment in soil fertility, and provide a basis 
for public intervention. For instance, if farmers cannot obtain credit, they may not be able to 
invest in profitable investments. Specifically, the market imperfections and high rate of time 
preference generate inter-temporal externalities that distort investment decisions. In addition 
to these demand-side factors, problems could also come from the supply of fertilizer 
(Crawford et al., 2003; Morris, et al., 2007). For instance, poor infrastructure, high transaction 
costs and a non-competitive marketing system can also make fertilizer supply unviable. Duflo 
et al. (2010) invoke systematic behavioural biases involved in investment decisions to explain 
the low adoption of fertilizer despite its high rate of return. Their model predicts that some 
farmers will plan to buy fertilizer, yet will fail to follow through on these plans. Therefore, 
fertilizer subsidies should increase fertilizer use among farmers who are hyperbolic and lead 
to overuse of fertilizer among those who are time-consistent. The model also implies that 
fertilizer subsidies need not be huge to induce farmers to use fertilizer when they are offered 
just after harvest. In addition to the theoretical model, Duflo et al. (2010) also find that a 
significant proportion of the farmers in Kenya are present-biased.  
The primary role of input subsidies in agricultural development should be to promote 
adoption of new technologies and accelerate agricultural production (Ellis, 1992). Despite the 
failure of past fertilizer subsidy programmes, many agricultural experts still view fertilizer 
subsidies as a viable means to restore soil fertility and hence ensure food security and 
eliminate malnutrition and poverty in SSA (Morris et al., 2007; Denning et al., 2009). Yet, 
Crawford et al. (2003) note that the huge fiscal burden of the earlier fertilizer subsidy 
programmes contributed to the macroeconomic crises. Moreover, Morris et al. (2007) hold 
that the past efforts to promote fertilizer in Africa were too narrowly concentrated on 
stimulating increases in fertilizer use without crowding in other complementary inputs such as 
investment in soil and water conservation.  
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However, the new subsidy programmes rely on innovations in programme implementations to 
overcome the shortcomings of the past fertilizer subsidy programmes (Banful, 2011). For 
instance, World Bank (2008) and Morris et al. (2007) maintain that the new subsidy 
programmes in SSA must be temporary and help develop fertilizer markets. The new subsidy 
programmes serve as mechanisms to provide subsidized inputs and services designed both to 
promote market development and to enhance the welfare of the poor. Investment in soil and 
water conservation is required in order to stimulate the demand for fertilizer (Place et al., 
2003; Morris et al., 2007). This is because it increases agricultural productivity and incomes 
and consequently increases the demand for fertilizers. Minot and Benson (2009) hold that 
voucher programmes provide an opportunity to train farmers and input suppliers on efficient 
and profitable fertilizer use. Under a voucher system, farmers are given vouchers to be sent to 
private input suppliers to acquire fertilizer cheaper. Thus, a voucher is an income transfer 
which can promote investment in soil and water conservation if credit is a binding constraint 
to such investments. The vouchers are also a way to guarantee a demand for fertilizer, which 
in turn ensures a reliable fertilizer supply. To a large extent, these objectives will be met if the 
subsidy programmes increase fertilizer uptake and at the same time crowd in investment in 
soil and water conservation.  
Public discussions on the design and implementation of fertilizer subsidies in SSA can be 
linked to two different viewpoints. The first is based on the premise that soil resources have 
been so extensively degraded that fertilizer adoption alone will be inadequate to address the 
protracted nutrient mining (see e.g. Stoorvogel and Smaling, 1990; Stoorvogel et al., 1993; de 
Jager et al., 1998). As such, Integrated Soil Fertility Management (ISFM) programmes have 
been suggested to overcome the protracted land degradation. ISFM programmes are 
comprehensive in the sense that they increase fertilizer adoption and investment in soil and 
water conservation (Conway, 1997; Heerink, 2005; Misiko and Ramisch, 2007; Place et al., 
2003). Each of the components in ISFM relies on a different household resource endowment, 
with fertilizer requiring financial resources and investment in soil and water conservation 
requiring labour. Scoones and Toulmin (1999) suggest that a combination of organic and 
inorganic materials in agriculture promotes agronomic efficiency and sustainability. Janssen 
(1998) notes that both uptake efficiency and utilisation efficiency depend on factors such as 
availability of water and other nutrients, and balanced provision of nutrients is the best 
guarantee for their optimal use. Furthermore, ISFM programmes ensure that soil fertility and 
plant nutrient supply from all possible sources of plant nutrients are optimized, i.e. that soil 
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fertility is achieved through a balanced use of mineral fertilizers and biological sources of 
plant nutrients.  
The second viewpoint is that a well-designed, fertilizer-only, programme may be preferable to 
the wider-reaching programmes outlined above. This viewpoint emerges from actual 
implementations of fertilizer subsidy programmes in SSA. The historical experiences from 
1960s and 1970s suggest that wide- ranging policy packages with large number of different 
components can be distortionary, and that more limited interventions are likely to be 
successful in practice. There are also fiscal constraints which make more targeted 
programmes attractive. For these reasons, many governments have chosen to adopt fertilizer 
subsidy programmes that only promote fertilizer adoption. For instance, whereas Malawi and 
Kenya have adopted the provision of fertilizer with improved seed, Ghana and Nigeria only 
subsidize fertilizer. Thus, in reality, the current fertilizer subsidies dwell on the provision of 
fertilizer and there is little attempt to promote labour-intensive sustainable land management 
directly (Heerink, 2005). The promotion of fertilizer only through fertilizer subsidies can be a 
cost effective way of investing in soil fertility for sustainable agricultural production 
especially if the fertilizer use provides a strong incentive for farmers to invest in soil and 
water conservation. There will then be an indirect promotion of the required complementary 
inputs, without any need for the government to be actively involved in promoting these inputs 
directly.  
A number of studies evaluate the impact of public programmes on investment in soil and/or 
water conservation and fertilizer adoption. As regards the impact of public programmes on 
investment in soil and/or water conservation, Berg (2002) finds that public works and self-
employment programmes reduce fertilizer use; thus, employment programmes cannot be used 
to promote fertilizer adoption. The mechanism is that public employment programmes reduce 
the effect of risk on fertilizer use, and there is thus no component in this programme that 
directly promotes fertilizer adoption. Gebremedhin and Swinton (2003) analyze the effects of 
public programmes (i.e. existence of food-for-work programmes and mandatory community 
labour) on investment in soil conservation in Northern Ethiopia. The evidence suggests that 
availability of food-for-work programmes increases the adoption of stone terraces but 
decrease the adoption of soil bunds. Moreover, direct public involvement in constructing soil 
conservation structures on private lands undermines incentives for private conservation 
investments; however, public conservation activities on public lands encourage private soil 
conservation through demonstration effects. Holden and Shiferaw (2004) develop a bio-
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economic model with market imperfections to evaluate the impact of hypothetical seed and 
fertilizer credits on adoption of sustainable soil and water management strategies in Ethiopia. 
The model results indicate that fertilizer credits reduce soil and water conservation work on 
the fields, but that this negative effect could be mitigated through linking a conservation 
requirement to the fertilizer credit. Hagos and Holden (2006) also assess the relationship 
between public-led conservation programmes and private investment in soil conservation in 
Ethiopia, and their findings indicate a positive relationship. Similarly, Holden and Lunduka 
(2010) evaluate the impact of fertilizer subsidies on agricultural yields and manure use. They 
find that fertilizer and manure are complements, since the studied farmers who applied more 
fertilizer also used more manure. However, the subsidy dummy is not statistically significant. 
As can be seen, the existing evidence on the impacts of public programmes on conservation 
investments is thus mixed.  
The present paper seeks to extend the existing literature on the impact of public programmes 
on soil and water conservation by evaluating the impact of fertilizer subsidies on investment 
in soil and water conservation. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 
discusses the fertilizer subsidy programme as implemented in Ghana. Section 3 presents a 
brief discussion of the study area and the sampling method. Section 4 explains the 
econometric models used in the estimation. Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
 
2.0: The Fertilizer Subsidy Programme in Ghana 
The global food crisis of 2007/2008 was a source of major concern all over the world and 
politically destabilized a number of governments. Governments responded to the crisis in 
many different ways. In Ghana, the government implemented a fertilizer subsidy programme 
in 2008 to promote the domestic production of agricultural output.  
The subsidy programme involves a number of innovations in programme implementation in 
order to achieve its objectives (Banful, 2009). First, the government adopted a voucher system 
where the government prints region-specific and product-specific vouchers. The vouchers are 
then distributed by agricultural extension agents to farmers within their so-called operational 
areas. Subsidized fertilizer can be purchased upon presentation of a voucher and a matching 
cash amount. Instead of allowing government officials to distribute fertilizer – which was a 
major drawback of many fertilizer programmes in the past – the current programme relies on 
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private agents to distribute fertilizer vouchers. Secondly, an advantage of the new system 
noted by e.g. Minot and Benson (2009) is that it creates an opportunity for farmers to interact 
with extension officers regarding efficient and profitable use of fertilizer and investment in 
soil and water conservation.  
In this way, the programme nurtures a relationship between farmers and extension officers 
that could outlast the subsidy programme. According to Banful (2009), the involvement of 
extension officers in the distribution channel offers additional benefits as it facilitates 
dissemination of information regarding extension services. Moreover, by interacting with 
extension officers, farmers gain access to information on the adoption of sustainable 
agriculture practices. These new measures have the potential to promote investment in soil 
and water conservation. However, the fertilizer subsidy programme in Ghana is not an 
integrated soil fertility management programme since it only provides fertilizer vouchers 
without any other visible effort to stimulate investment in soil and water conservation.   
There are elements in the fertilizer subsidy programme that could promote demand for and 
supply of fertilizer and hence facilitate fertilizer market development in Ghana in the long 
run. For instance, the adoption of the voucher system could have this effect. Voucher systems 
represent income transfers that promote demand for fertilizer in the short run, but this could 
sustain the demand for fertilizer beyond the duration of the fertilizer subsidy programme 
because of higher profits and investment in complementary inputs. That the vouchers are used 
to acquire fertilizer from private fertilizer agents in Ghana enables the fertilizer agents to 
benefit from economies of scale, and provides incentives for fertilizer agents to develop new 
distribution networks that could remain after the fertilizer subsidy programme. Also, as 
previously mentioned, the interaction between farmers and extension officers permits 
extension officers to educate farmers on fertilizer use and sustainable land management. A 
number of studies have found that access to information and extension officers increase 
investment in soil and water conservation (see e.g. Place and Dewees, 1999; Pender and 
Gebremedhin, 2008; Kassie et al., 2009). 
 
3.0: Study Area and Sampling Method 
The questionnaire for this study was administered among smallholder farmers at the Afife 
Irrigation Project in the Volta Region of Ghana in February-May of 2010. The Afife Irrigation 
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Project is located in one of the rice growing districts in the country. The cross-sectional data 
for the analyses was collected through a survey of smallholder rice farmers. We randomly 
selected 550 farmers, of which 548 chose to participate. Due to item non-responses, the final 
sample was reduced to 460 farmers, implying a participation rate of 84%. A total of 190 
farmers benefitted from the fertilizer subsidy programme, and the remaining 270 acquired 
fertilizer from the open market. 
The questionnaire includes questions about socio-economic variables such as age of the 
farmer; marital status; number, age and gender of dependents; farming experience; plot 
characteristics; investment in soil and water conservation; fertilizer adoption; and 
participation in collective work. Also, to determine the individual discount rate, each farmer 
was presented with two hypothetical work programmes from which they had to choose one. 
The first programme (Option A) involved a programme that would pay the farmer 150 GHS 
(Ghana cedis) in one month’s time, whereas Option B would pay the farmer 200 GHS in six 
months to reflect seasonal decision making. The farmer was also asked to quote a value for 
Option B that would make him/her indifferent between the two programmes. The discount 
rate of the farmer was then calculated as the 2
1
log η
η
 
 
 
 where 2η is the value indicated by the 
farmer and 1η  is the value of Option A (i.e. 150 GHS).  
As part of the study, the extension officers at the Afife Irrigation Project were asked to rank 
the fertility, slope, soil type and level of erosion of plots. Soil fertility, slope and degree of soil 
erosion were ranked on a 1-10 scale. Investment in soil and water conservation was measured 
as the number of days that the farmer engaged in soil and water conservation activities per 
hectare. Also, we collected data on the distance that farmers travelled to their plots. Based on 
this information, we also calculated the distance to the fertilizer voucher distribution depot.  
 
4.0: Econometric Model  
Many of the stated goals of the new subsidy programmes seek to increase the demand for 
fertilizer in the long run. However, the success in this respect depends on the extent to which 
fertilizer subsidy programmes crowd in investments in soil and water conservation for higher 
productivity and income, since such investments help farmers afford fertilizer inputs in the 
future. Two factors determine the choice of the econometric model.  
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The first one is that the dependent variable, i.e. investment in soil and water conservation, is a 
count data variable. That is, we measure investment in soil and water conservation as the 
number of farm days a farmer devotes to investing in soil and water conservation per hectare. 
Thus, models designed for continuous dependent variables are inappropriate. 
The second factor to consider is the potential problem of endogeneity of participation in the 
fertilizer subsidy programme. Selection into the programme can be determined by unobserved 
factors, and these factors can also affect investments in soil and water conservation. Ignoring 
the selection into the endogenous dummy variable could thus lead to biased and inconsistent 
estimates of the impact of the subsidy programme on investment in soil and water 
conservation, especially in the presence of unobserved individual heterogeneity (Heckman, 
1979; Mullahy, 1997). 
Terza (1998) outlines three estimation methods to address the endogenous dummy 
explanatory variable problem in count data models. In the first alternative, a two-stage method 
of moments could be used, following the Heckman’s sample selection model. In this 
procedure, a probit model constitutes the first stage, and it is estimated for the endogenous 
dummy dependent variable. The second stage involves the estimation of a regression model 
with the multiplicative correction factor by non-linear least squares. A second alternative is 
estimation of non-linear weighted least squares. A third alternative is to use a full information 
maximum likelihood endogenous switching estimation procedure which, according to Terza 
(1998) provides the statistically most efficient estimator subject to distributional assumptions. 
Monte Carlo simulations also show that this estimation procedure provides the smallest 
standard deviation (see Oya, 2005).  
Here, we use the full information maximum likelihood endogenous switching model to 
evaluate the impact of fertilizer subsidy on soil and water conservation effort. The derivation 
of the econometric model in this section follows Terza (1998), Miranda (2004) and Miranda 
and Rabe-Hesketh (2006). Conditional on a set of explanatory variables denoted as ix  in this 
instance, an endogenous dummy variable denoted iSub  and an error term denoted iε , the 
investment in soil and water conservation effort follows a standard Poisson distribution:  
 ( )
( ){ } ( ){ }' 'exp exp exp
| ,
!
iSWC
i i i i i i
i
i
x Sub x Sub
f SWC
SWC
β γ ε β γ ε
ε
− + + + +
=  (1) 
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where ( )f   is the conditional probability distribution and iSWC  represents the investment in 
soil and water conservation for the i:th farmer. The unobserved latent variable *iSub  is defined 
by the process 
 * ,i i iSub z uα= +  (2) 
where z is a vector of exogenous variables, α  are the corresponding unknown parameters and 
u  is the error term. The latent variable is related to the endogenous variable through the 
process defined as  
 
*1 is observed if 0
  .
0 otherwise
i
i
Sub
Sub
>
= 

 (3) 
Assuming that the two error terms are jointly normal with zero mean, the covariance matrix 
( )∑  is given as  
 
2
.
1
σ σρ
σρ
 
∑ =  
 
 (4) 
There is exogenous switching (i.e. iSub  is exogenous) if 0ρ = . In this case, consistent 
estimates of β  and γ  can be obtained by estimating only the investment equation. However, 
if 0ρ ≠ , there is endogeneity. 
The conditional joint probability density function is given as 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )* *, | | , , 1 1 | ,if SWC Sub w f SWC w Sub d Sub f w dεε ε ε ε ε
∞
−∞
= Φ + − −Φ∫  (5) 
where ( ) ( )*
21
zα ρ σ ε
ε
ρ
 +
 Φ = Φ
 − 
 and ( )|f wε ε  is the conditional distribution of ε  given 
the exogenous variables, which are represented by w . The joint normality of the two error 
terms ε  and u  conditional on w  indicates that ( )|f wε ε  is normal with zero mean and 
variance 2σ .  
Given the functional form of ( )| , ,i if SWC w Subsidy ε , the log-likelihood is specified as 
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 ( ) ( )
1
| ln , |
n
i i i
i
L w f SWC Subsidy wµ
=
=∑  (6) 
where n  is the sample size, µ  is the set of parameters to be estimated including variance and 
covariance of the two error terms. One notable problem with maximizing equation (6) is that 
( ), |i i if SWC Sub w  cannot be evaluated in closed form (Terza, 1998). However, by defining 
2
εζ
σ
 
=  
 
 and rewriting the normal probability distribution function, we can rewrite the 
likelihood function under the Poisson version of the model as  
 ( )
{ } { }{ }' 'exp exp exp
| , , ,
!
SWC
i i i i
i i i
i
x Sub x Sub
f SWC w Sub
SWC
β γ ε β γ ε
ε
+ + − + +
=  (7) 
and with the change in variable by replacing ε  with 2σζ , the ( )f   can be re-written as  
 ( ) { } { }{ }
' 'exp 2 exp exp 2
| , , 2 .
!
SWC
i i i i
i i i
i
x Sub x Sub
f SWC w Sub
SWC
β γ σζ β γ σζ
σζ
+ + − + +
= (8) 
The full information maximum likelihood endogenous switching model will estimate both the 
investment in soil and water conservation and the participation in the fertilizer subsidy 
programme. Thus, the above model will capture the effects of the subsidy programme on 
investment in soil and water conservation efficiently. Kassie et al. (2010) use the same 
framework to evaluate the impact of sustainable land management practices on the net value 
of agricultural production in different agro-ecological areas in Ethiopia. 
The main identifying assumption used here is that access to information and the mode of 
voucher distribution determine the participation in the fertilizer subsidy programme. Thus, we 
rely on the distance to the source of information to achieve exclusion restrictions, i.e. the 
distance between the farmer’s place of residence and the voucher distribution point. This 
means that we implicitly assume that farmers who live farther away from the distribution 
point are less likely to access information about the vouchers and thus less likely to participate 
in the programme. Hence, we adopt distance to voucher distribution point as the instrument. 
This follows the findings in the literature that proximity to subsidy programmes enhances 
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participation (e.g. Allard et al., 2003). As regards the elements in the ix vector, we follow the 
empirical studies on investment in soil and/or water conservation, e.g. Berg (2002), 
Gebremedhin and Swinton (2003), Holden and Shiferaw (2004), Hagos and Holden (2006), 
Solis et al. (2007), Kassie, et al. (2010).  
 
5.0: Results 
5.1: Description and summary statistics 
Table 1 presents the description and the summary statistics of the data. Approximately 75% of 
the farmers are male, and this proportion is similar among both the farmers who participated 
in the fertilizer subsidy programme and those who did not. An average farmer had about 17 
years of farming experience, and the mean difference in years of experience between those 
who received fertilizer under the fertilizer subsidy programme and those who did not is not 
statistically significant. The average plot size is 2 ha among both beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries of the programme, which implies that our sample consists of smallholder 
irrigation farmers. Half of the sampled households were engaged in alternative employment in 
addition to farming. The household labour endowment is significantly lower among 
programme beneficiaries. 
However, the discount rates are higher among beneficiaries of the subsidy programme: The 
extrapolated average discount rate per six months is 62% and 53% among the farmers who 
did and did not participate in the fertilizer subsidy programme, respectively. The mean 
difference in discount rate between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries is statistically 
significant ( )i.e. 0.01p < . Holden et al. (1998) suggest that high time preferences reduce 
incentives for investment in soil conservation. Thus, one potential explanation could be that 
the beneficiaries may want to compensate for the low investment in soil conservation with 
fertilizer use. The average discount rate is 56.5% per season, which is similar to the interest 
rate charged by money lenders, which is 50% per season.  
The average ranking for soil fertility is about 5, and the ranking for soil erosion is 2. Also, the 
rankings indicate that the fertility of the plots was the same among the farmers who benefitted 
from the programme and those who did not. Soil erosion is also quite low. However, the level 
of erosion of the plots was ranked lower for farmers who benefitted from the programme than 
for those who did not. Two dummy variables were constructed to capture the locations of the 
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plots. The proportion of plots located at the tail end of the canal is the same for the two 
groups. However, the proportion of plots located in the middle of the canal is lower among 
the farmers who benefitted from the fertilizer subsidy programme than among those who did 
not. The soil types are the same for both groups.  
Lease holding is not common among the farmers: Only 8% of the total sample were lease 
holders. Moreover, this share was higher among the farmers who did not participate in the 
fertilizer subsidy programme. One possible explanation for the low share is that since lease 
holders are not registered with the authorities, the probability of being considered for the 
fertilizer subsidy programme is low.  
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTION AND SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES 
Variables Descriptions Non-beneficiaries Beneficiaries Difference Pooled 
Gender Dummy variable for farmer gender (= 1 if male) 0.743 0.758 -0.015 0.749 
Age Age of the farmer in years 46.55 46.17 0.38 46.39 
Experience Years of farming experience 16.513 17.762 -1.250 17.028 
Household wealth Total household wealth (in Ghana cedis) 3784.02 5451.51 -1667.49** 4480.61 
Discount rate Discount rate of the farmer for a period of six months 0.532 0.618 -0.086*** 0.56 
Alternative employment  Farmer being in alternative employment 0.589 0.511 0.078* 0.556 
Household labour  Number of household members who work on the farm 3.758 3.427 0.330** 3.621 
Hired labour Hired labour (days) 10.955 18.883 -7.928*** 14.227 
Collective work Number of days a farmer participates in collective work per season 2.401 3.049 -0.648** 2.668 
Other soil conservation Dummy variable for other soil conservation measures 0.313 0.251 0.062 0.287 
Plot size Plot size (in hectares) 2.006 2.019 -0.012 2.011 
Middle plot Dummy variable for plot being located in the middle 0.216 0.089 0.127*** 0.163 
Tail plot Dummy variable for plot being located at the tail end 0.310 0.281 0.028 0.298 
Leasehold contract Dummy variable for leasehold (=1 if the farmer was leasing the plot) 0.102 0.057 0 .045* 0.084 
Soil erosion Soil erosion as ranked by extension officers on 1-10 scale 2.261 2.145 0.116* 2.213 
Plot slope Slope of plot as ranked by extension officers on 1-10 scale 3.020 2.944 0.076 2.988 
Soil fertility Soil fertility as ranked by extension officers on 1-10 scale 4.888 5.005 -0.116 4.936 
Clayey-loam soil Dummy variable for clayey-loamy soil 0.616 0.564 0.052 0.594 
Sandy-loam soil Dummy variable for sandy-loamy soil 0.142 0.123 0.019 0.134 
Distance to agent Distance between place of residence and voucher point (in km) 6.466 4.983 1.483*** 5.856 
SWC Days devoted to soil and water conservation per ha 4.854 4.489 0.365 4.704 
Statistical significance: * = p<0.10, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01. 
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We also counted the number of times farmers participated in collective work related to 
maintenance of irrigation canals. The level of participation reported is statistically higher 
among the programme participants than among the others. On average, farmers participated in 
this type of work about 3 times per season, while the average number of days per season that 
farmers reported engaging in soil and water conservation was almost 5. These investments in 
soil and water conservation entail construction of bunds and are interventions that increase 
productivity of land and inputs in SSA (Ouedraogo and Bertelsen, 1997; Kazianga and 
Masters, 2002). The average number of days is not significantly different between 
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Despite the fact that the mean difference in terms of soil 
and water conservation effort is not statistically significant, we still need to empirically 
evaluate the impact of the fertilizer subsidy on the soil and water conservation effort since the 
mean difference does not account for the effects of unobserved heterogeneity in the 
participation in the fertilizer subsidy. Also, there could be differences in the frequency 
distribution. We also quantified the amount of labour hired to work on the plots of the 
farmers. The hired input will only benefit the farmer. The average labour hired was 14 days, 
and this value is significantly higher among the farmers who benefitted from the programme.  
The assumption we used to justify the choice of the instrumental variable appears valid. The 
farmers who benefitted from the fertilizer subsidy programme on average live closer to the 
fertilizer voucher distribution point: The average distance between the farmer’s place of 
residence and the fertilizer distribution point among farmers who took fertilizer under the 
subsidy programme is 4.98 km, whereas the distance for the farmers who did not benefit from 
the fertilizer subsidy programme is 6.47km. The mean difference between the two averages is 
statistically significant ( )0.01p < .       
 
5.2: Evaluation of the Impact of the Fertilizer Subsidy Programme on Soil and Water 
Conservation Efforts 
The results for three different models are presented in Table 2. Models 2 and 3 are the results 
for the endogenous switching model while Model 1 is for the exogenous model. The results of 
the exogeneity assumption in Model 1 are presented for comparison purposes; our main 
results are presented under Model 2. Plot characteristics such as plot slope, soil fertility and 
soil type are unlikely to affect the distribution of vouchers. We therefore exclude these 
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variables from the subsidy equation in Model 3 to check the robustness of our results to 
different model specifications. The results in Model 3 are similar to those in Model 2. 
Model 1 reports the results under the assumption of exogeneity. That is, the results of Model 1 
are estimated under the restriction that there is no correlation between the error terms of the 
investment equation and the subsidy equations ( )i.e. 0ρ = . The results under Model 1 indicate 
evidence of overdispersion and unobserved heterogeneity since σ is positive and statistically 
different from zero ( )0.01p < . These results provide a justification for the estimation of the 
full information maximum likelihood endogenous switching model, which is presented in 
Model 2. It is also important to highlight the fact that participation in the fertilizer subsidy 
programme does not affect investment in soil and water conservation in Model 1. This is 
because the subsidy dummy is not statistically significant. The coefficient for the subsidy 
dummy is negative, though not statistically significant.  
The log-likelihood ratio test was used to test for the null hypothesis that 0ρ =  in Models 2 
and 3. The log-likelihood ratio test comparing the exogenous model to Model 2 is statistically 
significant ( )21 916.54;  0.01pχ = < . Similarly, the test comparing the exogenous model to 
Model 3 is also statistically significant ( )21 916.64;  0.01pχ = < . These test results imply that 
participation in the programme is endogenous, which justifies the adoption of the endogenous 
switching models.  
Models 2 and 3 present the results for the full information maximum likelihood endogenous 
switching model, which relaxes the exogeneity assumption and caters for unobserved 
heterogeneity found in Model 1. The results for Model 2 indicate that participation in the 
programme does not crowd in investment in soil and water conservation. The subsidy dummy 
is not statistically significant in this specification either. 
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 TABLE 2: REGRESSION RESULTS 
Independent variables MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
  Investment Subsidy Investment Subsidy Investment  Subsidy 
Subsidy -0.087 
 
0.264 
 
0.318    
 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.354) 
 
(0.340)    
 Natural logarithm of age of farmer -0.027 -0.225 -0.025 -0.221 -0.029    -0.154    
 
(0.197) (0.275) (0.268) (0.299) (0.269)    (0.283)    
Natural logarithm of household wealth 0.022 0.097** 0.023 0.098** 0.022    0.095**   
 
(0.035) (0.046) (0.043) (0.046) (0.043)    (0.045)    
Other investments in soil conservation -0.078 -0.169 0.033 -0.171 0.041    -0.201    
 
(0.112) (0.154) (0.141) (0.158) (0.140)    (0.151)    
Gender 0.023 0.060 0.022 0.068 0.021    0.057    
 
(0.108) (0.156) (0.147) (0.164) (0.147)    (0.156)    
Discount rate 0.591*** 0.883*** 0.420 0.887*** 0.411    0.832***  
 
(0.169) (0.259) (0.262) (0.262) (0.257)    (0.254)    
Natural logarithm of hired labour 0.100*** 0.155*** 0.092** 0.157*** 0.090**   0.145*** 
 
(0.030) (0.040) (0.043) (0.040) (0.041)    (0.038)    
Collective work 0.071*** 0.031* 0.053*** 0.031 0.052***  0.032*    
 
(0.009) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017)    (0.018)    
Natural logarithm of labour endowment 0.285** -0.190 0.297** -0.183 0.309**    -0.245*    
 
(0.117) (0.148) (0.123) (0.149) (0.125)    (0.140)    
Middle plot 0.566***  -0.611*** 0.614***  -0.628*** 0.629***  -0.655***  
 
(0.153) (0.220) (0.193) (0.223) (0.193)    (0.210)    
Leasehold contract 0.331* -0.279 0.203 -0.265 0.206    -0.255    
 
(0.169) (0.261) (0.219) (0.252) (0.219)    (0.237)    
Tail plot -0.019  -0.277* 0.031  -0.278* 0.024    -0.180    
 
(0.106) (0.148) (0.144) (0.149) (0.140)    (0.142)    
Alternative employment 0.058  -0.282** 0.133  -0.280** 0.138     -0.280**   
 
(0.098) (0.141) (0.129) (0.140) (0.128)    (0.134)    
Plot slope -0.053 0.067 -0.094 0.069 -0.086                    
 
(0.081) (0.115) (0.098) (0.111) (0.098)                    
Soil erosion -0.001 -0.139 0.117 -0.141 0.102                    
 
(0.085) (0.123) (0.103) (0.116) (0.101)                    
Soil fertility 0.081* 0.120 0.052 0.115 0.064                    
 
(0.046) (0.074) (0.063) (0.077) (0.064)                    
Clayey-loam soil -0.164 -0.045 -0.252 -0.050 -0.258                    
 
(0.137) (0.208) (0.178) (0.208) (0.175)                    
Sandy-loam soil -0.237 0.120 -0.254 0.102 -0.245                    
 
(0.178) (0.274) (0.224) (0.269) (0.222)                    
Natural logarithm of experience -0.330*** 0.260*  -0.379*** 0.261*  -0.384***  0.263**   
 
(0.098) (0.144) (0.127) (0.141) (0.128)    (0.133)    
Natural logarithm of plot size -0.022  -0.357** 0.084  -0.358** 0.081     -0.281*   
 
(0.124) (0.166) (0.149) (0.158) (0.147)    (0.151)    
Natural logarithm of distance to agent 
 
-0.374*** 
 
-0.376*** 
 
 -0.299*** 
  
(0.102) 
 
(0.102) 
 
(0.087)    
Constant 0.566 -0.643 0.594 -0.660 0.555    -0.477    
  (0.818) (1.092) (1.048) (1.176) (1.051)    (1.054)    
Sigma 
 
1.035*** 
 
1.004*** 
 
1.008*** 
  
(0.049) 
 
 (0.063) 
 
(0.065)    
Rho  
   
 -0.202 
 
 -0.234 
    
(0.204) 
 
(0.194) 
Wald 2χ  162.55*** 157.72*** 149.13*** 
Number of observations 460 460 460 
  Standard errors in parentheses.  Statistical significance: * = p<0.1, ** = p<0.05, *** = p<0.01. 
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The regression results identify a number of determinants of investment in soil and water 
conservation. Hired labour and investment in soil and water conservation are complementary. 
Similarly, farmers with higher household labour endowment invest more in soil and water 
conservation. Both results reveal that investment in soil and water conservation requires 
labour resources. Also, farmers who participate in joint work with other farmers also invest 
significantly more in soil and water conservation. However, farmers who have extensive 
experience in farming allocate less days to investment in soil and water conservation. Farming 
experience could endow farmers with higher labour quality for investment in soil and water 
conservation. The location of plots affects investment in soil and water conservation in that 
farmers whose plots are located in the middle of blocks spend more days on investment in soil 
and water conservation as compared to the base category, the farmers with head plots.  
The results also indicate a number of factors that determine participation in the fertilizer 
subsidy in Ghana. First, farmers who live farther away from the fertilizer voucher distribution 
point are less likely to participate in the fertilizer subsidy programme. This provides a 
justification for the exclusion restriction, and also supports existing literature that proximity to 
a welfare programme affects participation (Allard et al., 2003). Similarly, participation in 
joint work with other farmers increases the likelihood of participating in the fertilizer subsidy 
programme. These two determinants of participation could be interpreted to mean that access 
to information is relevant for participation. Farmers with higher household wealth are more 
likely to participate in the fertilizer subsidy programme. Also, farmers with higher rate of time 
preference are more likely to participate in the fertilizer subsidy programme. Furthermore, 
hired labour affects participation in the fertilizer subsidy programme. Farmers who engage in 
alternative employment are less likely to participate in the fertilizer subsidy programme. 
However, farmers with more years of farming experience in farming are more likely to do so. 
 
6.0: Conclusions 
The main objective of the present paper is to evaluate the impact of fertilizer subsidies on 
investment in soil and water conservation. This follows an implicit assumption in many 
fertilizer subsidy programmes that fertilizer subsidies will nudge investment in soil and water 
conservation. We adopt a full information maximum likelihood endogenous switching model 
that handles unobserved heterogeneity in the selection into the studied subsidy programme to 
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simultaneously estimate soil and water conservation efforts and participation in the 
programme.  
The results indicate that beneficiaries of the fertilizer subsidy programme do not invest more 
in soil and water conservation efforts as compared to non-beneficiaries. These findings 
suggest caution on reliance on farmers to respond to fertilizer subsidies with complementary 
inputs to ensure efficient and optimal nutrient uptake for agricultural production and fertilizer 
market development. The interaction between farmers and extension officers that was 
promoted as part of the fertilizer subsidy programme in Ghana does not result in significant 
investment in soil and water conservation. Previous studies of similar programmes (see e.g., 
Place and Dewees, 1999; Pender and Gebremedhin, 2008; Kassie et al., 2009) have indicated 
that access to information and extension officers can increase investment in soil and water 
conservation, but this does not appear to be happening with the fertilizer subsidy programme 
in Ghana.  
The results that the participation in the fertilizer subsidy programme does not yield significant 
investment in soil and water conservation appear to be consistent with the broader 
interpretations of the theoretical model and empirical findings of Duflo et al. (2010) that 
farmers may not undertake profitable fertilizer investments. It is likely that the behavioral 
biases that prevent profitable fertilizer investment (e.g. hyperbolic discounting) could also 
account for lack of investments in soil and water conservation to support fertilizer adoptions. 
The combination of increased fertilizer use with soil and water conservation investments 
would not only help ensure efficient and optimal nutrient uptake but could also offer a 
protection of agricultural production in SSA against climate change. The investment in soil 
and water conservation is seen as a measure to hedge agricultural production in SSA against 
climate change since these soil and water conservation investments will mitigate the growing 
water shortages, worsening soil conditions, and drought and desertification (IPCC, 2001; 
Kurukulasuriya and Rosenthal 2003). Given the importance of investment in soil and water 
conservation for achieving the stated objectives of the new fertilizer subsidies, efforts should 
be made to promote investment in soil and water conservation in addition to the fertilizer 
subsidies. These measures would increase output and income among the farmers. The finding 
from the study that participation in the fertilizer subsidy programme does not lead to such 
investments thus suggests that further intervention may be needed. 
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Thus, the fertilizer subsidy programme alone does not nudge Boserup (1965). This suggests 
that for the programme to crowd in investments in soil and water conservation, 
comprehensive measures that promote fertilizer adoption and investment in soil and water 
conservation simultaneously, such as an integrated soil fertility management programme, may 
be preferable.  
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